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In the midst of the fiery Intifada grew an Islamic
movement that was second only to Fatah in its
influence and a serious competitor to the PLO.
Hamas (meaning “zeal” in Arabic and the acronym for
Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya or “Islamic
Resistance Movement”) was an offshoot of the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB), an Egyptian organization espousing
Islamic ideals, with branches throughout the Arab
world. Its leader, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin,
(assassinated in March, 2004) ran the Palestinian
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood from its base in
the Gaza Strip when Gaza was still a part of Egypt.
After the 1967 war and the incorporation of Gaza
into Israel, Yassin continued to develop the social
programs that were the cornerstone of the
organization while emphasizing its Palestinian
character and patriotism.
When the Intifada began, the Palestinian Muslim
Brotherhood changed its name to Hamas and helped
fuel the uprising by distributing leaflets and
encouraging insurgency. With its headquarters in
Gaza, where Palestinian refugees experienced the
worst socio-economic hardships, Hamas was able to
build a large base of supporters. In contrast, the
PLO, based in remote Africa, was distanced from the
refugees they claimed to represent.
Also, unlike the secular Palestinian Liberation
Organization, Hamas members believed that Palestine
was an Islamic waqf (property permanently set aside
for religious purposes) that could not be divided or
shared — although, as a Muslim state, Christians,
Jews and other religious minorities would be
permitted to peacefully coexist with Muslims and
practice their faiths freely.
In the battle to liberate Palestine from the
Zionists and reestablish it as an Islamic state,
Hamas advocated armed struggle and ultimately
all-out jihad (holy war). Towards this end, Hamas
trained and dispatched an army of “freedom fighters”
or mujaheddin (holy warriors) who had been recruited
to further the cause by targeting soft Israeli
targets — in most cases by detonating explosives
strapped to their bodies in public places. Those who
died in the name of jihad were lauded in the
community as martyrs who deserved a special place in
heaven.43 Families of the fallen “heroes” were also
rewarded with large sums of money and honored by
their Palestinian neighbors. The bombings, which
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Israeli
civilians, earned Hamas a place in U.S. President
George W. Bush’s official list of terrorist groups
in November 2001.
In addition to its military enterprises, Hamas
devoted much of its annual budget to extensive
social services. The Islamic Charity operated a
network of schools, orphanages, health clinics and
welfare programs —all sorely needed in
the squalid refugee camps. It also ran youth-league
volleyball and soccer teams in the Gaza strip and
provided food and cash to impoverished Palestinians.
To fund these programs (which were not offered by
the PLO or any other Palestinian groups), Hamas
depended on financial aid from abroad. Pious Muslims
observing one of the five requirements in Islam, the
giving of charity or zakat, eagerly donated money to
Hamas to pay for its humanitarian services and a
broad network of charity associations were set up
around the world to coordinate these financial
transactions. Because of Hamas’ charitable nature,
U.S. government efforts to freeze the assets of
Hamas leaders to curb Hamas-sponsored attacks in
Israel were interpreted by some Muslims as acts
against Islam.
Since its creation, Hamas was accepted as an
alternative organization to the PLO and attracted a
number of Palestinians who were drawn by the
movement’s benevolent works, emphasis on Islam and
perceived dedication to the Palestinian cause. The
PLO, conversely, was discredited by many Hamas
supporters as a corrupt, secular institution that
sold out to the Israelis and the Americans by
participating in the peace process. Hamas leaders
were violently opposed to the Oslo Accords of 1993
and other compromises with the Israelis which they
viewed as furthering the Zionist goal “to expand
from the Nile to the Euphrates.”44
The popularity of Hamas and its condemnation of the
peace process put Arafat in a difficult position. On
the one hand, if Arafat undertook any measures to
suppress Hamas activity he risked being accused by
Palestinians of doing Israel’s bidding and helping
the Zionists undermine the opposition. On the other
hand, any association between the PLO leader and the
militant organization could derail the peace process
(which was predicated on Arafat’s promises to put an
end to terrorism in Israel) and threaten his
international role as a mediator between the
Palestinians and the Israelis. To avoid
confrontation, therefore, Arafat maintained a
delicate balance between the two poles by
simultaneously appeasing the West (by publicly
denouncing violence and arresting Hamas leaders) and
supporting the Palestinian cause (by releasing Hamas
prisoners shortly after they were detained and
praising the “martyrs” in Arabic.)
The more moderate Palestinian Authority President
Mahmoud Abbas faced a similar dilemma when Hamas won
the majority of seats in the January 2006
parliamentary elections.
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